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The Protection of Innocence Under
Section 7 of the Charter
Kent Roach*

Unlike debates about the proper reach of section 7 of the Charter with
respect to health care or welfare rights, the idea that principles of
fundamental justice would be offended by the imprisonment of the
innocent is utterly uncontroversial. Indeed, as early as Reference re
Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S. 94(2),1 Lamer J. stated that “[i]t
has from time immemorial been part of our system of laws that the
innocent not be punished. This principle has long been recognized as an
essential element of a system for the administration of justice which is
founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of the human person and
on the rule of law”.2 The anxiety about the appropriate role of the
judiciary that has caused the Court to pull back when giving content to
the principles of fundamental justice even in other areas of criminal
justice such as the imposition of fault3 or harm4 standards do not seem to
apply to the judicial duty to protect the innocent. If any subject is within
the inherent domain of the judiciary, it is the protection of the innocent
from punishment.
The principle that the innocent not be punished is as compelling as
it is uncontroversial. In United States of America v. Burns,5 the Court
*

Professor of Law, University of Toronto. The financial assistance of the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council with respect to this paper and a larger project on the comparative
study of miscarriages of justice is gratefully acknowledged. I am very grateful to Michael Code,
Patrick Healy, Dale Ives, David Paciocco, Christopher Sherrin and James Stribopoulous for very
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Yaara Lemberger-Kenar provided helpful
research assistance.
1
[1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 69.
2
Id., at para. 67. The Court has repeatedly relied on this principle in subsequent cases.
See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326; R. v. Seaboyer, [1991] S.C.J. No.
62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577; R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411; R. v. Leipert,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 14, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 281, at para. 24; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3
S.C.R. 668.
3
R. v. Creighton, [1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3.
4
R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571.
5
[2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283.
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not only took notice of the tragic reality of wrongful convictions, but
changed its interpretation of section 7 of the Charter in recognition of
the risk that they may occur in the future.
Although the principle that the innocent not be punished is a
bedrock principle of fundamental justice, it is not self-executing or easy
to administer. There is a danger that the principle will be used in an ad
hoc manner and as a rhetorical flourish. Properly understood, however,
the principle that the innocent not be punished can be one of the
unifying principles of section 7 as it relates to the administration of
justice.6 The principle that the innocent should not be punished reflects
our basic expectation that the justice system be just. It stands for an
abiding commitment that our justice system will take all reasonable
precautions to prevent and remedy miscarriages of justice.
The principle that the innocent not be convicted operates at two
levels: one in relation to an individual case in which there is reason to
think that a person may have suffered a miscarriage of justice7 and
second in relation to systemic measures that can be taken across cases to
minimize the risk of miscarriages of justice and especially wrongful
convictions8 in future cases. Both aspects of the principle must be
respected because while it is important to minimize the risks of
wrongful convictions at a systemic level, systemic reforms will not be
full-proof. With respect to individual cases, the Court should be guided
by the principle that guilt should be established beyond a reasonable
doubt and it should be reluctant to balance a reasonable possibility or a
reasonable doubt about innocence against social interests. At the same
time, the idea of balancing competing interests, or its more disciplined
cousin of allowing proportionate restrictions on rights, is perhaps

6
In this paper, I focus on the criminal trial process, but the concept of miscarriages of
justice can apply to other areas such as long term detention under immigration law where people
are deprived of life, liberty and security of the person without “sufficient safeguards for the
determination of whether the criteria for detention accurately apply to that person”. Kent Roach &
Gary Trotter, “Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terrorism” (2005) 109 Penn. State L.
Rev. 967, at 1037.
7
A miscarriage of justice is a broader concept than the wrongful conviction of a person
who is “actually innocent”. It would include the conviction of a person in the face of a reasonable
doubt or a reasonable possibility of innocence, as well as denying a person a fair trial.
8
A wrongful conviction is a sub-category of the broader concept of a miscarriage of
justice and refers to the conviction of those who are actually innocent. Courts do not usually
recognize the concept of innocence as part of the regular trial process, but they have taken notice of
the conviction of the innocence and have recognized the concept of innocence in the process of reopening convictions. See Reference re Milgaard, [1992] S.C.J. No. 35, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 866.
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unavoidable when discussing systemic measures to minimize the risk of
wrongful convictions in future cases. The latter conclusion may strike
many concerned about wrongful convictions as problematic and even
morally suspect. Nevertheless, I will suggest in the first part of this
paper that it is supported by the writings of two of the 20th century’s
leading theorists of law and rights: Lon Fuller9 and Ronald Dworkin.10
Moreover, I will suggest that a more forthright recognition of the
competing interests at stake and application of principles of
proportionality when crafting systemic measures may produce more, not
less, protections against the risk of wrongful convictions.
The analytical distinction between the need under section 7 to
respond to the risk of wrongful convictions in future cases and the need
to respond to the possibility of a miscarriage of justice in an individual
case will be used throughout this paper. I will explore the implications
of the dual aspects of preventing miscarriages of justice by examining
the Court’s decision in United States of America v. Burns.11 In that case,
the Court was concerned not so much with the risk of a wrongful
conviction or a miscarriage of justice in the individual case before it, but
rather with the systemic risk of a wrongful conviction in future cases
should fugitives be extradited without assurances that the death penalty
would not be applied. Burns is revealing because it engaged in a form of
proportionality analysis that the Court failed to perform a decade earlier
in Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice)12 when it ruled that a fugitive
could be extradited to face the death penalty. The proportionality
analysis in Burns reached the conclusion that the state’s legitimate
interest in extradition could be satisfied in a less rights invasive manner
by obtaining assurances that the death penalty not be applied. The use of
proportionality analysis in Burns supports the idea that systemic reforms
designed to minimize the risks of wrongful convictions will require
some form of interest balancing. Moreover, it suggests that a disciplined
proportionality analysis will often produce more, not less, protections
for the accused.
The Court’s section 7 jurisprudence on disclosure will next be
examined in light of the dual aspects of protecting innocence discussed
9

Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), at

179-80.
10
11
12

Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), c. 3.
[2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283.
[1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779.
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above. The Court’s decision in R. v. Stinchcombe13 required full
disclosure to the accused of all relevant and non-privileged information
in the Crown’s possession in no small part to respond to the risk,
identified by the Marshall Commission,14 that lack of full disclosure
could contribute to wrongful convictions in future cases. The Court
boldly created a broad right to disclosure in all cases in part because of
its concern about Parliament’s inertia in responding to the Marshall
Commission’s recommendations that disclosure requirements be
included in the Criminal Code. At the same time, however, the Court
engaged in a balancing of interests and concluded that a right to
disclosure would not only make the trial process fairer, but more
efficient. I will also examine the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence
enforcing Stinchcombe and suggest that the Court has made a useful
distinction between a broad right to disclosure that can help prevent
wrongful convictions in future cases and a narrower right to full answer
and defence which responds to the danger of a miscarriage of justice in
specific cases before the Court.15
In the next section, I will examine how the rights of the accused to
disclosure and to full answer and defence have fared in the face of
legislative replies to the Court’s controversial decisions in R. v.
Seaboyer16 and R. v. O’Connor.17 Parliament altered the balance of
interests set by the Court in an effort to assert equality and privacy
rights of child and female complainants and the social interest in
encouraging the increased reporting of sexual offences. The legislative
activism in the Parliamentary replies to these two cases stands in stark
contrast to the legislative inertia that characterizes many measures that
might help prevent wrongful convictions in the future, including the
accused’s right to disclosure. I will examine how the Court in R. v.
Mills18 and R. v. Darrach19 upheld the Parliamentary replies to its
previous cases in an attempt to reconcile the rights of the accused with
those asserted on behalf of complainants. I will express some concerns
13

[1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326.
Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (Halifax:
Queens Printer, 1989), at 238-44.
15
R. v. Dixon, [1998] S.C.J. No. 17, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244; R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No.
75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307.
16
[1991] S.C.J. No. 62, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577.
17
[1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.
18
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668.
19
[2000] S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443.
14
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that the Court’s approach to reconciling rights in these cases may
underestimate how these Parliamentary replies may increase the
systemic risk of wrongful convictions in future cases, especially in cases
where the accused may be under-represented and not prepared to bring
the necessary and onerous pre-trial motions. At the same time, however,
the Court in Mills and Darrach may have also read down the legislation
in a manner that may allow trial judges to side with the rights of the
accused in individual cases where a refusal to introduce or disclose
sexual or therapeutic history evidence could contribute to a miscarriage
of justice in an individual case.
This article on the protection of innocence under section 7 of the
Charter lies within Lamer J.’s idea that the focus of section 7 should be
on the justice system.20 It is thus not surprising that the remainder of the
paper will examine how section 7 of the Charter may affect police,
prosecutors, defence lawyers, judges, juries and appellate courts as they
administer criminal justice. I will explore how section 7 of the Charter
has informed civil liability for police and prosecutorial misconduct.
Starting with Nelles v. Ontario,21 the Supreme Court has rejected claims
that prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil actions and have
allowed civil actions for malicious prosecution. Similarly, the Court
rejected claims that prosecutors should be absolutely immune from law
society disciplinary action in Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta22 and
opened the possibility that a prosecutor could be subject to professional
discipline for ethical breaches in relation to non-disclosure of evidence.
The availability of both civil and disciplinary remedies can help to
address individual cases in which improper conduct has contributed to a
miscarriage of justice. At the same time, the high standard of malice or
improper purpose required in Nelles and Krieger may not have
established optimal conditions for systemic reforms to decrease the risk
of misconduct that contributes to wrongful convictions. With respect to
police conduct, the Court in Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse23 recognized
the role of negligence liability and it will soon hear Hill v. HamiltonWentworth Regional Police24 which raises the important issue of

20

See Jamie Cameron in this volume.
[1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, at 195-96.
22
[2002] S.C.J. No. 45, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372.
23
[2003] S.C.J. No. 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263.
24
Hill v. Hamilton Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2005] O.J. No. 4045
(C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. granted [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 511.
21
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whether the police should be held liable for negligent investigative
practices, in this case relating to the identification of an Aboriginal
person who was wrongfully convicted of a robbery. This case will raise
important issues concerning the remedies that are available to victims of
wrongful convictions and systemic measures to minimize the risk of
wrongful convictions in future cases.
Police and prosecutors are not the only criminal justice participants
who have contributed to wrongful convictions. The Royal Commission
on the Donald Marshall Prosecution recognized the role of ineffective
assistance of defence counsel in that wrongful conviction.25 In the next
section, I will focus on adequate assistance of defence counsel by
examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under section 7 of the
Charter as it relates to the provision of legal assistance at trial26 and
claims of inadequate assistance after trial.27 In both cases, I will suggest
that the Court has recognized that un-represented or under-represented
accused may in some individual cases be victims of miscarriages of
justice, but that it has not defined the rights to effective assistance of
counsel so as to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions in future
cases. Even with respect to the danger of a miscarriage of justice in an
individual case, I will argue that the Court has placed too heavy a
burden on the accused to overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct is constitutionally adequate and to demonstrate a reasonable
probability of a miscarriage of justice. This latter requirement does not
fit other doctrines such as the jurisprudence on the right to full answer
and defence that are responsive to a reasonable possibility of a
miscarriage of justice in an individual case.28
Although police, prosecutors and defence counsel all play a key role
in wrongful convictions, the ultimate decision to convict is made by
judges and juries. I will examine the Court’s evolving approach to the
need for judicial reasons to justify a conviction. After some initial
hesitation, the Supreme Court has appropriately affirmed that trial
judges should give reasons to justify their verdicts. Nevertheless, it has

25
Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution (Halifax:
Queens Printer, 1989), at 72-77.
26
G. (J.) v. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services), [1999] S.C.J.
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46.
27
R. v. G.D.B., [2000] S.C.J. No. 22, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 520.
28
R. v. Dixon, [1998] S.C.J. No. 17, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244; R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No.
75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307.
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refused to articulate a right to reasons under section 7 of the Charter as a
systemic reform that would improve decision making and lessen the risk
of wrongful convictions, but has rather tied the sufficiency of reasons to
the existing grounds of appeal.29 Although this provides the possibility
of remedies in individual cases where there is a miscarriage of justice or
an unreasonable conviction, the Court’s approach begs the question of
whether the existing grounds of appeal are adequate. As such, it must be
understood in the context of the Court’s decision to reject proposals
made by the Commission on Guy Paul Morin’s wrongful conviction that
appellate courts should allow appeals on the basis of a lurking doubt
about guilt.30
The Court’s approach to the reasons why juries may convict is even
less satisfactory from the perspective of the protection of innocence. In
R. v. Pan,31 the Court turned its back on the reasons that may have
motivated a jury’s decision to convict. It has also left to Parliament the
overdue task of reforming the overbroad offence against disclosing the
deliberations of the jury even though such matters would seem to be
within the inherent domain of the judiciary and implicate section 7
concerns about the protection of the innocent. Although the Court has
recognized the dangers and experience of wrongful convictions in Burns
and other cases and has generally been attentive to claims of
miscarriages of justice in individual cases, more work needs to be done
in crafting optimal systemic responses to decrease the risk of wrongful
convictions in future cases.

I. THE INDIVIDUAL AND SYSTEMIC DIMENSIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE
THAT THE INNOCENT NOT BE PUNISHED
There are at least two dimensions to the principle of fundamental justice
that the innocent not be punished. In the first dimension, the principle
that the innocent not be convicted or punished relates to individual
cases. In this context, it is possible to speak of an absolute rule that the
innocent not be punished regardless of the consequences for society. To
take the extreme hypothetical of a knowing prosecution of an innocent
29
R. v. Sheppard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869; R. v. Braich, [2002] S.C.J.
No. 29, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 903; R. v. Gagnon, [2006] S.C.J. No. 17, 2006 SCC 17.
30
Hon. Fred Kaufman, Report on the Guy Paul Morin Prosecution (Toronto: Queens
Printer, 1998); R. v. Biniaris, [2000] S.C.J. No. 16, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 381.
31
R. v. Pan, [2001] S.C.J. No. 44, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 344.
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person, police, prosecutors, witnesses and even judges32 who willfully
and knowingly participated in the conviction of an innocent person
could be guilty of the crime of obstructing justice or related crimes.33
Prosecutors who knowingly prosecuted an innocent person would be
subject to civil actions34 and professional discipline35 and police officers
would also be subject to civil suits for the intentional tort of misfeasance
in the use of a public office.36 The principle that the innocent not be
punished in individual cases applies not only to deliberate misconduct of
the type posited above, but also to other individual cases such as
applications to adduce fresh evidence37 or appeals relating to
undisclosed evidence or the reasonableness of the verdict.38 Here the
courts would be obliged to respect both the principle that the innocent
not be punished, as well as the related principle of proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.39
Matters become more complicated and controversial when a second
dimension of the principle that the innocent not be punished is
considered. In this second dimension, the principle applies not to

32
Judges, however, could not be compelled by a public inquiry to explain why they
convicted an innocent person or even why they sat on a case when they had a prior involvement
with the accused. MacKeigan v. Hickman, [1989] S.C.J. No. 99, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796. The judges,
including Pace J. who had been Attorney General of Nova Scotia at the time of Donald Marshall’s
wrongful conviction, were, subject to an inquiry by the Canadian Judicial Council that did not
require them to testify and did not recommend that they be removed from office. Inquiry Report
(1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 292.
33
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 139. See also s. 140 of the Code defining the
crime of public mischief to include making false statements to a peace officer accusing people of
committing crimes and ss. 131, 134, 136 and 137 relating to perjury and other forms of giving false
evidence.
34
Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170; Proulx v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 9 discussed infra.
35
Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372 discussed
infra.
36
Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] S.C.J. No. 74, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263.
37
R. v. Palmer, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759.
38
R. v. Taillefer, [2003] S.C.J. No. 75, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 307.
39
In R. v. Lifchus, [1997] S.C.J. No. 77, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, at para. 13, Cory J. stated
that the principle of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
is of fundamental importance to our criminal justice system. It is one of the principal
safeguards which seeks to ensure that no innocent person is convicted. The Marshall, Morin
and Milgaard cases serve as a constant reminder that our system, with all its protections for
the accused, can still make tragic errors. A fair trial must be the goal of criminal justice.
There cannot be a fair trial if jurors do not clearly understand the basic and fundamentally
important concept of the standard of proof that the Crown must meet in order to obtain a
conviction.
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individual cases in which innocence is a real possibility, but to all future
cases. In other words, this second dimension applies to the crafting of
rules to guide future cases so as to minimize the risk that the innocent
will be convicted. At this point, some may object to the notion that any
risk of convicting the innocent is acceptable. A discussion of acceptable
risks of miscarriages of justice is as uncomfortable as the discussion of
acceptable risks of cancer or plane crashes. There is an understandable
desire to argue that everything that is humanly possible must be done to
avoid these risks and that there is no acceptable level of risk. Set against
this is the fact that in other contexts, including those such as the
prevention of disease and accidents, society and the law regularly relies
on risk management. The due diligence defence that is required as a
principle of fundamental justice,40 at least when prison is used as a
penalty,41 is based on the idea that not every step to prevent a wrong will
be reasonable and it increasingly embraces risk management
techniques.42
Even with respect to wrongful convictions, some eminent
philosophers of law have taken the position that there is no absolute
right to a system of justice that takes every possible precaution against
the punishment of the innocent. Lon Fuller, who is famous for his
natural law position defending the internal morality of law, addressed
this very problem in his famous 1963 Storrs Lectures. Professor Fuller
explained:
… if the question be asked, “How much effort should be expended to
make certain that no innocent man is ever convicted of crime?,” the
answer is apt to run toward the absolute, and the suggestion may even
be made that where fundamental human rights are at stake a question
so indecently calculative should not even be raised. Yet when we
reflect that in order to make sure that a decision is right we must
consume the scarce commodity of time, and that a right decision too
long delayed may do more damage to the accused himself than a
mistaken decision promptly rendered, the matter assumes a different
aspect. We then perceive that even in this case we are compelled to

40
R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299; Reference re Motor Vehicle Act
(British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
41
R. v. Pontes, [1995] S.C.J. No. 70, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 44.
42
See generally Todd Archibald, Ken Jull & Kent Roach, Regulatory and Corporate
Liability: From Due Diligence to Risk Management (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2005).
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make a calculation that is in the broad sense “economic” even though
money costs are completely left out of account.43

Ronald Dworkin, famous for his understanding of rights as trumps
and his distinction between principle and policy, also draws a similar
distinction between a “profound right” of a particular person not to
suffer the “moral harm” of being convicted of a crime that he or she did
not commit and what he dismisses as an “impractical” and false claim
that each citizen “has a right to the most accurate procedures possible to
test his guilt or innocence, no matter how expensive these procedures
might be to the community as a whole”.44
Professor Dworkin adds an important qualification to his conclusion
that there is no right to the most accurate procedures possible: the risk of
a miscarriage of justice should not be imposed disproportionately in
violation of the right to equal concern and respect.45 Given the racial,
class and mental health demographics of the exonerated, Professor
Dworkin’s exception threatens to swallow his main argument that there
is no right to the most accurate criminal justice system possible.46
Nevertheless, it is significant that two of the 20th century’s leading
theorists of rights both drew a distinction between the right of the
innocent in an individual case never to be punished and the more
difficult question of how far society should go to prevent the risks of a
wrongful conviction being imposed on some unknown person in the
future. Although the notion of balancing interests when dealing with
wrongful convictions remains unsettling, the next part of this article will
suggest that when the Supreme Court squarely tackled this issue in its
43

Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2d ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), at

179-80.
44
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), at
72, 77. For an argument that Dworkin reduces criminal procedure to matters of policy to be left to
the legislature and that the principle that the innocent not be convicted recognized by Dworkin in
individual cases requires prophylactic rules requiring corroboration and expanded appellate powers
see Michael Plaxton, “A Dworkian Theory of Criminal Procedure”, unpublished SJD Thesis,
University of Toronto, 2004.
45
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), at
88. He also argues that there is a right to have criminal procedure recognize wrongful convictions
as a moral harm and to a “consistent weighting” of that moral harm and that “the content of these
rights provides a middle ground between the denial of all procedural rights and the acceptance of a
grand right to supreme accuracy”. Id., at 89-90.
46
For an argument that the risk of imprisoning the innocent is now being
disproportionately imposed on non-citizens under Canada’s security certificate regime see Kent
Roach & Gary Trotter, “Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror” (2005) 109 Penn. State
L. Rev. 967, at 1002ff.
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decision in United States of America v. Burns, the result was to increase
protection for all accused including those who may be wrongfully
convicted in some future case.

II. FROM KINDLER TO BURNS: SEARCHING FOR A PROPORTIONATE
RESPONSE TO THE RISK OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided that extradition to the United States
without assurances that the death penalty would not be applied did not
violate section 7 of the Charter. The majority judgments written by both
La Forest and McLachlin JJ. decided the issue under section 7 of the
Charter. Justice La Forest stressed the importance of balancing
competing interests and gave considerable weight to the danger that
Canada, given its shared border with the United States, could become a
safe haven for fugitive American murderers. Justice La Forest also drew
an analogy between extradition and deportation and suggested that both
were united in their concerns about ensuring “that a specific kind of
undesirable alien should not be able to stay in Canada”47 and by the need
for judicial deference to the executive.48 This theme of deference to the
executive was also stressed by McLachlin J. in her majority judgment
where she emphasized that the executive was in a better position than
the Court to balance competing interests including those “of comity and
security”.49 Perhaps because they decided the issue under section 7 of
the Charter and found no violation of the Charter, neither La Forest nor
McLachlin JJ. considered whether there were more proportionate means
to honour Canada’s extradition obligations. Indeed, at one point,
McLachlin J. framed the issue as whether it would be “better that a
fugitive not face justice at all rather than face the death penalty”50
despite the fact that the Minister of Justice had not attempted to seek
assurances from American authorities that the death penalty would not
be applied.
The neglect of proportionality analysis in Kindler was unfortunate
because it would have required the state to demonstrate why its
legitimate interests in extradition could not be pursued without placing
47

Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] S.C.J. No. 63, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, at

para. 134.
48
49
50

Id., at para. 138.
Id., at para. 176.
Id., at para. 182.
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the fugitive’s life at risk. One of the reasons why the majority of the
Court in Kindler avoided this issue was that it engaged in an internal
balancing of interests within section 7 and never reached section 1.
Although the Court has not always been consistent on this point, it often
does not reach section 1 in its section 7 cases because of its early
decision to hold that violations of section 7 cannot be justified under
section 1 of the Charter except perhaps in emergencies.51 Somewhat
paradoxically, the marginalization of section 1 under section 7 may have
contributed a process where, as in Kindler, section 7 rights are defined
more narrowly than they might have been should the balancing of
interests have been conducted under section 1.52 Under section 1, the
state would have the burden of justifying limits whereas the balancing
of conflicting interests within section 7 places the burden on the
accused. Moreover, the balancing of interests under section 7 tends to be
much less structured and disciplined and more open-ended than if the
analysis was conducted under the familiar proportionality test of section
1 of the Charter.53
In his dissent in Kindler, Cory J. found that extradition to face the
death penalty violated section 12 of the Charter by imposing cruel and
unusual punishment. He described the indignity of various modes of
execution, but did not address the possibility of executing an innocent
person. Although wrongful convictions were not as prominent in 1991
as they were in 2001, they were hardly a secret. Hugo Bedau and
Michael Radelet had a few years earlier published a landmark study
outlining 350 miscarriages of justice in American capital cases from
1900 to 1985.54 In Canada, the report of the Commission into Donald
51
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and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, at para. 78; R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. No.
25, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687, at para. 92.
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Marshall Jr.’s Wrongful Conviction was published in 1989 and had
raised awareness of wrongful convictions throughout the Canadian
criminal justice system. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself had relied on
this report when it decided the landmark R. v. Stinchcombe55 decision on
the accused’s right to disclosure. Nevertheless, neglect of the risk of
wrongful convictions in Kindler may also be related to the fact that only
one group, Amnesty International, intervened in the 1991 case while in
Burns a number of associations representing criminal lawyers concerned
with wrongful convictions intervened in the case.56 One significant
feature of Cory J.’s dissent on section 12, however, is that it featured the
section 1 proportionality analysis that was lacking in the majority’s
decision. Under section 1, Cory J. stressed that there was no evidence to
support the majority’s concerns about Canada becoming a safe haven
for American murderers and that Canada’s extradition obligations could
be fulfilled by extraditing with assurances that the death penalty would
not be applied.57
In 2001, the Supreme Court re-visited the issue of extradition to
face the death penalty in United States of America v. Burns.58 Although
the Court cited other developments such as the abolition of Canada’s
last vestiges of the death penalty, a growing international movement
towards abolition and the dangers of extended stays on death row, the
main and strongest justification given by the Court for requiring
assurances that the death penalty not be applied was the dangers of
executing the innocent. The Court stated:
Legal systems have to live with the possibility of error. The
unique feature of capital punishment is that it puts beyond recall the
possibility of correction. In recent years, aided by advances in the
forensic sciences, including DNA testing, the courts and governments
in this country and elsewhere have come to acknowledge a number of
instances of wrongful convictions for murder despite all of the careful
safeguards put in place for the protection of the innocent. The
instances in Canada are few, but if capital punishment had been
“Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study” (1988) 41 Stanford L. Rev. 121.
But see also Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, “The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and
Cassell” (1988) 41 Stanford L. Rev. 161.
55
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carried out, the result could have been the killing by the government of
innocent individuals. The names of Marshall, Milgaard, Morin,
Sophonow and Parsons signal prudence and caution in a murder case.
Other countries have also experienced revelations of wrongful
convictions, including states of the United States where the death
penalty is still imposed and carried into execution.59

The structure of this statement is interesting because at one level it
limits the Court’s concerns to the death penalty even though a fugitive
extradited from Canada could still be wrongfully convicted and,
consistent with the Court’s ruling, die in prison. In this passage the
Court may be performing, albeit somewhat silently, the balancing of
competing interests that is said in Kindler and Burns alike to underlie
section 7 of the Charter. In other words, the Court may be balancing the
interest in not punishing the innocent against the state’s interest in
extraditing fugitives and finding that the former prevails only when the
punishment imposed is the irreversible one of execution.
Although Burns generally prohibits extradition without assurances
that the death penalty will not be applied, it also stands for the converse
proposition that extradition is constitutional so long as the death penalty
is off the table. As the late Dianne Martin insightfully indicated, one
shortcoming in the Court’s otherwise praiseworthy recognition of the
risk of wrongful convictions is that its decision does nothing to address
the risk of wrongful convictions in non-death penalty cases. Indeed, as
Professor Martin pointed out shortly after Burns was decided, the
extradition process itself remains one that lacks some of the safeguards
normally found in criminal trials.60
The only full-proof way to prevent the risk that Canada will
participate in a miscarriage of justice in a foreign land would be for
Canada to follow the lead of some rogue states and simply refuse to
extradite all fugitives. This stance, however, would unduly sacrifice
Canada’s interests in fulfilling its obligations under its extradition
treaties. It would also beg the question of miscarriages of justice at
home. The logical conclusion of the absolutist idea that any risk of a
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miscarriage of justice is unacceptable might be that all sentences of
imprisonment or perhaps all convictions violate the principles of
fundamental justice. No one who wants to be taken seriously would go
that far. Once the abolitionist response to wrongful convictions is
rejected, however, we are left with the vexing question of how should
the courts balance or reconcile the state’s legitimate interest in
controlling crime with the right of the innocent not to be punished.
One problem with the balancing process as it was conducted in
Burns, however, was that it was tacit and opaque. This may be related to
the rather unstructured character of all balancing of interests exercises in
general, but it may also be related to an understandable reluctance of
judges to admit openly that they are willing to accept any level of risk of
wrongful convictions as an acceptable level of risk. As discussed in Part
I of this paper, both Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin made provocative
arguments that while wrongful convictions in individual cases always
constitute grave moral harms, there is no right to the most accurate
criminal justice system possible. The analogue in the Charter
jurisprudence are the Court’s frequent statements that section 7 does not
guarantee procedures that are the most favourable to the accused, but
only the basics of a fair trial.61
Statements that the Charter does not guarantee the most favourable
procedure or the most accurate system possible are conclusions not
reasons. They fail to address the critical questions of the extent to which
additional procedural protections will on the one hand minimize the risk
of wrongful convictions and on the other hand harm social interests.
Professor Fuller argued that this is an “economic” question while
quickly adding that money costs are not relevant. Fuller’s position
updated to take into account modern rights protection and the Charter
would revolve around issues of proportionality. In other words, the
modern version of the “economic” approach to balancing competing
interests would be to focus on the proportionality question of whether
there is a less rights invasive means of securing the state’s security
interest. The main difference between Kindler and Burns is that the
Court in the latter case addressed this issue of proportionality and
rejected the idea that “the United States would prefer no extradition at

61
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all to extradition with assurances”.62 In other words, the Court in Burns
concluded that extradition with assurances that the death penalty not be
applied was a more proportionate means to advance Canada’s legitimate
interests in extradition while better respecting the rights of the accused
in relation to the unavoidable risk of wrongful convictions. Not
surprisingly, the Court’s assessment of proportionality was most explicit
when it concluded as part of its section 1 analysis that extradition with
assurances that the death penalty would not apply would be a less
restrictive means for Canada to co-operate with foreign states and deter
fugitives from coming to Canada.63 The section 1 analysis in Burns
produced more, not less, protection of rights than the internal balancing
of interests conducted in Kindler.
Although the right of the innocent not to be punished may exist as
an absolute right in individual cases, a focus on individual cases
obscures the fact that many rights and rules, including the one
proclaimed in Burns, will be proclaimed as general rules that apply
across cases and will apply, as in Burns, even in cases where there is no
reasonable possibility to suspect that a wrongful conviction will occur.
Once rights are seen as applying across cases and influencing the
criminal justice system as a whole, proportionality analysis may well be
appropriate to discipline the balance that is struck between competing
values. Seen in this light, it was appropriate for the Court in Burns to
have considered whether state interests in extradition could be satisfied
in a more proportionate manner and Kindler was wrongly decided
precisely because it did not address the question of whether Canada’s
interests in extradition could be secured in a less rights invasive manner.
If social interests are to limit the rights of the accused, this should be
done in a transparent manner and the government should have to justify
any limits on those rights as reasonable and proportionate under section
1 of the Charter.64
It would be a mistake to read Burns as simply a case about
extradition and the death penalty even though the Court’s holding was
limited to those issues. The recognition of the reality and risk of
wrongful convictions in Burns should affect how the Court approaches
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the administration of section 7 of the Charter in the criminal justice
system and beyond. Having accepted that the problem of wrongful
convictions exists both at home and abroad, it would be hypocritical for
the Court to limit its response to extradition. In Burns, the Court could
not very well tell the United States how to reform its criminal justice
system to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions, but the Court does
not have the same problem on the homefront. Indeed, the Court should
be bold and confident in this area precisely because it concluded that
“occasional miscarriages of the criminal law are located in an area of
human experience that falls squarely within ‘the inherent domain of the
judiciary as guardian of the justice system’”.65 The Court elaborated on
this theme by stating that:
The avoidance of conviction and punishment of the innocent has
long been in the forefront of the basic tenets of our legal system. It is
reflected in the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter
and in the elaborate rules governing the collection and presentation of
evidence, fair trial procedures, and the availability of appeals.66

The principle that the innocent not be convicted articulated in this
passage has implications that go far beyond the limited context of
extradition and the death penalty. In the remaining parts of the paper, I
will examine whether the Court has lived up to the promise of Burns
both in terms of ensuring that reasonable and proportionate efforts are
made in all cases to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions and
whether the Court has been sufficiently responsive to claims that a
miscarriage of justice may have occurred in the individual case before it.

III. DISCLOSURE AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
The Supreme Court’s section 7 jurisprudence giving the accused a broad
right to disclosure of relevant evidence in the possession of the Crown is
arguably the most important development in our criminal justice system
in the last quarter century. It has transformed the way the justice system
operates and this new right has been crafted in no small part as a
systemic measure that would apply across cases to lower the risk of
wrongful convictions. The failure to disclose inconsistent statements
and exculpatory material has played an important role in many wrongful
65
66
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convictions. The Marshall Commission for example revealed how Mr.
Marshall was deprived of inconsistent statements made by the witnesses
who perjured themselves in his murder trial and exonerating evidence
that was given to the police shortly after his conviction.67
In R. v. Stinchcombe, the Court dealt with the accused’s request for
the written and recorded statements that the police had taken from his
former secretary after she had given evidence favourable to the accused
at the preliminary hearing. The Court built on a decision earlier that year
that affirmed a common law right to disclosure from the Crown68 but
took the step of constitutionalizing the right to disclosure as a principle
of fundamental justice under section 7 of the Charter. Justice Sopinka
explained:
The right to make full answer and defence is one of the pillars of
criminal justice on which we heavily depend to ensure that the
innocent are not convicted. Recent events have demonstrated that the
erosion of this right due to non-disclosure was an important factor in
the conviction and incarceration of an innocent person. In the Royal
Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution … the
Commissioners found that prior inconsistent statements were not
disclosed to the defence. This was an important contributing factor in
the miscarriage of justice which occurred and led the Commission to
state that “anything less than complete disclosure by the Crown falls
short of decency and fair play”.69

In some respects, the Court went beyond the Marshall
Commission’s recommendations70 that the Criminal Code be amended
to require disclosure by concluding that all relevant and non-privileged
information held by the Crown should be disclosed without regard to
whether the information was inculpatory or exculpatory and without
regard to whether statements related to a person who might be called as
a witness. Such a broad right to disclosure can be defended as providing
the accused with all the available raw materials in the state’s possession
to combat the risk of error and to protect the accused’s right to full
answer and defence. The broad scope of the duty to disclose articulated
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by the Court in Stinchcombe may in some cases provide the accused
with some material to fight the phenomena of tunnel vision by arguing
that the police ignored evidence in its possession that was consistent
with the suspect’s innocence.
The Court’s constitutionalization of disclosure requirements was a
bold move. In taking the leap that it did, it is perhaps not surprising that
the Court first examined whether social interests would be harmed by
the new right to disclosure. Justice Sopinka predicted that disclosure
disputes could be avoided by the adoption of “uniform, comprehensive
rules for disclosure” and that disclosure could increase efficiency by
producing an “increase in guilty pleas, withdrawal of charges and
shortening or waiving of preliminary hearings”.71 Justice Sopinka may
have been overly optimistic in these predictions, but the fact that he
made them is significant because it suggests that the Court was not
prepared to impose broad disclosure obligations without regard to their
costs or their effect on competing social interests. As in Burns, the
Court’s consideration of whether increased rights were a proportionate
measure to protect innocence was not fatal to the case of reform.
Although the Court in Stinchcombe expressed some optimism that
uniform and comprehensive rules to govern disclosure would increase
efficiency in the criminal justice system, the new rights recognized in
the case have turned out to be quite costly to administer. For example,
the Stinchcombe case itself came back to the Court four years later when
the accused argued that the trial judge was correct to stay proceedings
when the Crown only disclosed copies as opposed to originals of the
secretary’s statements to the police. Justice Sopinka explained that the
Crown could only be expected to disclose what was in its possession
and that in the absence of misconduct in destroying the originals, a stay
of proceedings was not appropriate.72 In a number of decisions in the
1990s, the Court returned to questions such as the extent of the Crown’s
disclosure obligations,73 the limits of the Crown’s discretion to delay
disclosure and to protect the identity of informers,74 the concept of
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relevant evidence,75 the Crown’s duty to retain evidence and the proper
approach to lost material that could not be disclosed.76
In several cases, the Court distinguished between the accused’s right
to disclosure and the accused’s right to full answer and defence. In R. v.
Dixon,77 the Court stressed that not every violation of the accused’s right
to disclosure will violate the accused’s right to full answer and defence.
It indicated that a new trial will be a minimum remedy if the accused’s
right to full answer and defence has been violated and related that issue
to whether there is a reasonable possibility that the undisclosed evidence
would affect the reliability of the verdict.78 On the other hand, violations
of the right to disclosure require no such minimum remedies and can in
some cases be considered harmless. The Court’s dualistic approach to
the rights and remedies at stake in disclosure fits into the distinction
drawn in the first part of this paper between rights that attempt to reduce
the risk of miscarriages of justice in future cases and rights that respond
to the possibility of a wrongful conviction in the particular case before
the Court. In other words, the Court has maintained a broad and
generous approach to defining the right to disclosure in a manner that
requires the broadest form of pre-trial disclosure in all cases while
defining the right to full answer and defence more narrowly so that it is
only violated when there is a possibility that a trial has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice or an unfair trial.
In R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay,79 the Court demonstrated that it was
prepared to enforce the rights to disclosure and full answer and defence
with some rigour. The Court affirmed that the right to disclosure existed
at common law independent of the Court’s decision in Stinchcombe and
it again pointed out that a failure to make disclosure was one of the
causes of “catastrophic judicial errors” that had caused Donald Marshall
Jr.’s wrongful conviction.80 The case involved convictions, including a
guilty plea, by two accused to first degree murder. The undisclosed
evidence was discovered by the Poitras Commission into police
75
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misconduct and concerned inconsistent statements by some Crown
witnesses that were not disclosed to the accused, as well as other
statements by undisclosed witnesses that were inconsistent with the
Crown’s case, including one relating to the location of the 14-year-old
murder victim on the night she was killed. The Court found that there
was a reasonable possibility that the undisclosed evidence affected the
decision of one accused to plea, the reliability of the verdicts and the
fairness of the trial process. It also indicated that the test for dealing
with undisclosed evidence would be somewhat more generous to the
accused than the test for admitting fresh evidence on appeal.81 The Court
affirmed that a new trial would be the minimum remedy for a violation
of the accused’s right to full answer and defence. This minimal remedy
would apply without regard to competing social interests. At the same
time, the Court held that a stay of proceedings was appropriate for one
of the accused given the time he had already served and the fact that
another trial would “be the perpetuation of an injustice”.82
In justifying his decision to constitutionalize the accused’s right to
disclosure, Sopinka J. noted that the “legislators have been content to
leave the development of the law in this area to the courts”.83 This fits
into the pattern of Parliament being relatively unconcerned about the
dangers of wrongful convictions.84 As will be seen in the next section,
however, Parliament has been more active in restricting the accused’s
access to information and evidence in sexual assault cases.

IV. LIMITS ON THE ACCUSED’S RIGHTS TO DISCLOSURE AND
FULL ANSWER AND DEFENCE IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES
Although the Court filled a legislative vacuum when implementing
Stinchcombe, it encountered legislative resistance when implementing
the accused’s right to full answer and defence in sexual assault cases.
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This raises the delicate question of the incidence of wrongful
convictions in such cases. DNA analysis has increased the likelihood of
wrongful convictions being discovered in rape cases and 90 per cent of
exonerations in the United States in non-homicide cases are rape cases.
Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld have argued that it is important to learn
about wrongful convictions from the current experience of DNA
exonerations because they predict that DNA exonerations will
eventually dry up given contemporary standards of obtaining DNA
warrants and using DNA analysis to exclude suspects.85 The availability
of DNA material is greater in rape cases than other crimes and this
means that rape convictions are held to higher standards of review than
in cases where DNA is not available.86 It is thus not surprising that in
Canada several wrongful convictions have been revealed in sexual
assault and rape cases and this does not necessarily suggest that there is
a higher rate of error in such cases as opposed to other cases.
Nevertheless, it is disturbing that the names of those wrongfully
convicted of sexual assault in Canada remain relatively unknown.87 In
any event, it is clear that the accused’s right both to access and adduce
evidence has played out somewhat differently in the context of sexual
assault prosecutions, despite the fact that wrongful convictions have
occurred in such cases.
In R. v. Seaboyer88 the Court in a 7:2 decision held that the so-called
rape shield law that prohibited the introduction of evidence of the
complainant’s prior sexual conduct except with respect to rebuttal
evidence, evidence going to identity and evidence relating to the
incident in question, violated the accused’s right to make full answer
and defence. Justice McLachlin for the majority related the right to full
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answer and defence to the principle of fundamental justice that the
innocent should not be convicted:
Given the primacy in our system of justice of the principle that the
innocent should not be convicted, the right to present one’s case should
not be curtailed in the absence of an assurance that the curtailment is
clearly justified by even stronger contrary considerations. What is
required is a law which protects the fundamental right to a fair trial
while avoiding the illegitimate inferences from other sexual conduct that
the complainant is more likely to have consented to the act or less likely
to be telling the truth.89

The Court found that the law restricting the admissibility of defence
evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual conduct was overbroad
because of its restrictive pigeonhole approach and because it did not
distinguish between illegitimate uses of the evidence — those that used
the myths that a woman was more likely to have consented or less likely
to be believed because of her prior sexual activity — and legitimate uses
of the evidence directed at other relevant and probative issues in the trial.
Although the Court found that section 276 of the Code violated
section 7 of the Charter, it was prepared to consider the state’s case for
justifying the violation under section 1 of the Charter on a deferential
standard that conceived the case as involving the competing rights of the
accused and the complainant. It indicated that there was a rational
connection between the legislation and its objectives in preventing the
sexist use of sexual conduct evidence, but concluded that a law that
excludes “probative defence evidence which is not clearly outweighed
by the prejudice it may cause to the trial strikes the wrong balance
between the rights of complainants and the rights of the accused. The
line must be drawn short of the point where it results in an unfair trial
and the possible conviction of an innocent person. Section 276 fails this
test.”90 The Court reformulated a less categorical rule to determine the
relevance of prior sexual conduct evidence but one that, unlike the old
section 276, applied to the complainant’s prior sexual conduct with the
accused.
Parliament was under great pressure to act even though the Court
had already refashioned the common law rules to advance the objective
of preventing sexist use of sexual conduct legislation as far as was
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consistent with the accused’s right to full answer and defence. The new
section 276(1) embraced the Court’s understanding of impermissible
uses of sexual conduct evidence by providing that sexual conduct
evidence, whether with the accused or another person, was not
admissible “to support an inference that, by reason of the sexual nature
of the activity” the complainant was more likely to have consented or
less worthy of belief. In R. v. Darrach,91 the Court held that this rule
excluded evidence offered for illegitimate sexist reasons that was not
related to a fair trial. In other words the accused had no right to adduce
misleading or irrelevant evidence. At the same time, the Court also read
down section 276(1) so that it would not apply to prior sexual conduct
that was offered for a legitimate purpose not related to the sexual nature
of the activity. Justice Gonthier explained:
evidence of sexual activity is proffered for its non-sexual features,
such as to show a pattern of conduct or a prior inconsistent statement,
it may be permitted. The phrase “by reason of the sexual nature of that
activity” has the same effect as the qualification “solely to support the
inference” in Seaboyer in that it limits the exclusion of evidence to
that used to invoke the “twin myths”.92

The Court also held that the requirement in section 276(2) that the
sexual conduct evidence should have “significant probative value that is
not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to the proper
administration of justice” should be read down to refer to evidence that
“the evidence is not to be so trifling as to be incapable, in the context of
all the evidence, of raising a reasonable doubt”.93 In justifying this
reading down of the requirement that the evidence have significant
probative value, Gonthier J. employed both the French language version
of the law that did not include the word significant and the principle that
laws should be interpreted where possible to avoid violating the
accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial. Although such an
interpretative remedy would apply in all cases, it will be most relevant
in providing a remedy in a particular case in which denial of the ability
to call prior sexual conduct evidence might contribute to a miscarriage
of justice.
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Although it left some room for exceptions when required to respect
the accused’s right to full answer and defence, the Court in Darrach
upheld a law that will in general restrict the accused’s ability to call
prior sexual conduct evidence. To this end, it upheld various procedural
and substantive restrictions on the admissibility of prior sexual conduct
evidence. In particular, the Court upheld the requirement that the
accused submit an affidavit and be cross-examined on it when seeking
to justify the introduction of evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual
conduct. Furthermore, the Court upheld the rule that the complainant
could not be compelled to testify at the voir dire or subject to crossexamination by the accused as necessary to protect the complainant’s
privacy and to encourage the reporting of sexual offences. Such
procedural requirements and evidential restrictions may in some cases
deter accused persons from attempting to adduce such evidence. This
may particularly be true in cases in which the accused is un-represented
or under-represented by counsel. The un-represented or underrepresented accused may also not fully appreciate how, as discussed
above, section 276 has been read down in some crucial respects to
accommodate the accused’s right to full answer and defence. In these
ways, the new law may at the margins increase the risk that in some
cases the accused will not even attempt to adduce evidence that might
raise a reasonable doubt about guilt. Beyond this systemic concern,
however, section 276 as interpreted by the Court in Darrach appears to
have left room to allow sexual conduct evidence to be introduced when
required to respect the accused’s right to full answer and defence.
Professor David Paciocco, however, has expressed concerns that
Darrach is ambiguous on the issue of whether probative evidence could
be excluded because of its prejudice. He argues that such evidence should
never be excluded on the basis that it would be “an affront to the most
basic principles of our criminal justice system” to prefer the privacy
interests of the complainant or the social interest in encouraging
complaints to the accused’s right to introduce significant evidence that
could raise a reasonable doubt.94 At the same time, however, the Court
seems to have resolved at least two borderline issues in favour of the
accused: namely reading the twin myth exclusion down to prohibit the
introduction of sexual conduct evidence only by reason of the sexual
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nature of the activity and reading the requirement of significant probative
value down to a requirement that the evidence only be of more than
trifling probative value. In both cases, the Court related its decisions to
read section 276 down to the accused’s right to full answer and defence
and the related principle of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In
my view, the greater concern that the courts are running the risk of
ignoring evidence that might raise a reasonable doubt about the accused’s
guilt lies not so much with restrictions on the admissibility of the
complainant’s prior sexual conduct under section 276, but with respect to
restrictions under sections 278.1-278.9 on the production, disclosure and
admissibility of the complainant’s private records.95
In R. v. O’Connor,96 the Supreme Court dealt with an application for
defence access to complainants’ school, medical and counselling
records in an historical sexual assault prosecution. The majority of the
Court outlined a two-step procedure that would govern the production of
private records to the court and to the accused. It stressed that this new
procedure would not apply to private records already possessed by the
Crown which would be subject to the Stinchcombe duty of disclosure
and would be presumed to be relevant to the accused’s defence.97 At the
first stage, in order to justify production to the trial judge, the majority
ruled that the accused would have to establish the likely relevance of the
material to an issue at trial including the credibility of the complainant.
The majority stressed the difficulties faced by the accused who had not
seen the documents. The minority would only require production to the
judge at the first stage if the accused established that the material was
useful to the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. At
the second stage, the majority of the Court required a balancing of the

95
I thus must also disagree with Professor Paciocco’s suggestion that production issues are
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accused’s rights against the privacy rights of the complainant while the
minority would also require consideration of the equality rights of
women and children and the societal interest in encouraging
complainants to seek treatment and bring complaints of sexual assault.
The same split in the Court occurred in a subsequent case in which the
majority of the Court held that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate
remedy when a rape crisis centre had, consistent with its standard
policy, destroyed notes of an interview with the complainant. The
minority expressed doubts about the relevance of the interview notes
and concluded that a stay of proceedings was an excessive remedy.98
Parliament responded to all this controversy with new legislation
that codified a two-step procedure to govern production to the trial
judge and the accused. The new legislation departed from the majority’s
procedure in O’Connor by applying to records held by the Crown and
otherwise subject to Stinchcombe and by requiring consideration of
equality rights and social interests in reporting and counselling at both
the production and disclosure stages of the two-step process. Moreover,
the new legislation also provided an extensive list of 11 possible
assertions that an accused could make in an attempt to justify the
production of private records to the judge. The legislation then
categorically deemed that all 11 arguments, either alone or combined,
were insufficient to justify production to the court. Section 278.3(4) of
the Criminal Code is such an extraordinary piece of legislation that it
deserves to be quoted in its entirety:
278.3(4) Any one or more of the following assertions by the
accused are not sufficient on their own to establish that the record is
likely relevant to an issue at trial or to the competence of a witness to
testify:
(a) that the record exists;
(b) that the record relates to medical or psychiatric treatment, therapy
or counselling that the complainant or witness has received or is
receiving;
(c) that the record relates to the incident that is the subject-matter of
the proceedings;
(d) that the record may disclose a prior inconsistent statement of the
complainant or witness;
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(e) that the record may relate to the credibility of the complainant or
witness;
(f) that the record may relate to the reliability of the testimony of the
complainant or witness merely because the complainant or
witness has received or is receiving psychiatric treatment, therapy
or counselling;
(g) that the record may reveal allegations of sexual abuse of the
complainant by a person other than the accused;
(h) that the record relates to the sexual activity of the complainant
with any person, including the accused;
(i) that the record relates to the presence or absence of a recent
complaint;
(j) that the record relates to the complainant’s sexual reputation; or
(k) that the record was made close in time to a complaint or to the
activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge against the
accused.

As my colleague Hamish Stewart has observed, “taken literally, this
subsection seems to doom any application from the outset”.99
The new legislation also placed another barrier in the way of
production to the trial judge by providing that in determining whether
the record is likely relevant to an issue at trial, the judge should consider
not only the accused’s right to full answer and defence, but also the
complainant’s rights to privacy and equality100 and society’s interests in
encouraging the reporting of sexual offences and the obtaining of
treatment by victims of sexual offences.101 As Jamie Cameron has
observed, Parliament’s restrictive approach to production to the trial
judge is a direct reversal of the Court’s approach in O’Connor which
only balanced competing rights after the judge had seen the documents
and before they were disclosed to the accused and even then only
balanced the accused’s right to full answer and defence against the
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privacy rights of the complainant.102 In this respect, the legislation on its
face made more incursions on adjudicative fairness than even the
security certificate procedures under immigration law which allow the
judge (but not the detainee) to examine all possibly relevant evidence.103
Moreover, the private records legislation is also more restrictive than the
security certificate regime because it subjects material held by the state
to the same restrictive regime of deemed insufficient grounds and
balancing of competing rights and social interests whereas courts have
stressed the state’s duty to disclose all relevant evidence to the judge in
security certificate cases.104 The severe restrictions on production of
records to the judge in sections 278.3 and 278.5 of the Criminal Code
raise real questions about Parliament’s apparent lack of concern about
the dangers of convicting the innocent.
The final stage of the reply legislation governs whether private
records that are produced and examined by the judge in a private
hearing should then be disclosed to the accused. Here the judge is asked
again to balance the accused’s right to full answer and defence with the
complainant’s privacy and equality rights and the social interest in
reporting sexual assaults and receiving counselling. Consistent with
principles of proportionality, the legislation quite sensibly contemplates
disclosure to the accused subject to conditions designed to restrict the
invasion of privacy such as editing the document or restricting its
further distribution. The legislation also allows the trial judge to take a
variety of steps including editing and prohibiting further distribution of
the material.105
In R. v. Mills,106 the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality
of Parliament’s new regime for the production of records. Despite the
significant differences between the new regime and the O’Connor
regime, the Court declined to strike the law down. It stressed that
Parliament was entitled to diverge from the O’Connor scheme and to act
on its own interpretation of the Charter even when Parliament’s
interpretation of the Charter differed from that already provided by the
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Court on the same issue. The Court sought to legitimate this holding by
reference to the concepts of both reconciling competing rights and
fostering dialogue between courts and legislatures.107 I have expressed
my reservations about the Court’s approach to both rights and dialogue
elsewhere and will not repeat them here.108 I will only raise the
additional issue of how vulnerable the innocent are under a
reconciliation of rights approach that is loathe to admit that the
accused’s right to full answer and defence is being limited. As Ronald
Dworkin has observed with respect to the attenuated procedural
protections that are now being deployed with respect to terrorist
suspects, there is an important difference between admitting that a risk
of miscarriages of justice exists and simply ignoring and denying any
risk altogether.109 A jurisprudential approach that insists that the
accused’s rights are not being limited but simply reconciled with those
of victims and potential victims, especially when combined with one in
which the judiciary defers to the legislature’s interpretation of the rights
of the accused even when the legislature departs from the judiciary’s
prior interpretation of those rights, is one that is likely to increase the
risk of convicting the innocent.
The only dissenting voice in Mills came from Lamer C.J. and only
applied to Parliament’s decision to extend the restrictive production
regime to private records that were in the Crown’s possession. Chief
Justice Lamer reasoned:
As this Court maintained in Stinchcombe, supra, at p. 336, the
right of an accused to make full answer and defence is a pillar of
criminal justice on which we rely heavily to prevent the conviction of
the innocent. It is a principle of fundamental justice protected by ss. 7
and 11(d) of the Charter. Flowing from the right to make full answer
and defence is the Crown’s constitutional and ethical duty to disclose
all information in its possession reasonably capable of affecting the
accused’s ability to raise a reasonable doubt concerning his
innocence.110
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Chief Justice Lamer was not blind to the state’s interest in
protecting the complainant’s privacy and equality rights. He proposed as
a more proportionate means to advance these interests that all records
held by the Crown be disclosed not directly to the accused but to the
trial judge where they would be subject to the second stage of balancing
the accused’s rights against those of the complainant before being
disclosed to the accused.111 Chief Justice Lamer considered the section 1
case for limiting the accused’s right to full answer and defence, but
concluded that it could not be made out given less restrictive
alternatives and because “the risk of suppressing relevant evidence and
of convicting an innocent person outweighs the salutary effects of the
impugned provisions on privacy and equality rights”.112 His decision
reaffirms that a full and disciplined section 1 proportionality analysis
can often produce more, not less, protections for the innocent than the
more open-ended internal balancing and reconciliation of rights
approach taken by the majority in Mills.
Although the Court’s refusal to strike down the restrictive
legislative regime that governs production of records remains in my
view regrettable, it is important to recognize that the Court in Mills, as
in Darrach, has read down some of the features of the legislative regime
that may produce the greatest danger of denying the judge or the
accused access to evidence that may raise a reasonable doubt about
guilt. The majority in Mills recognized that the right to full answer and
defence “is crucial to ensuring that the innocent are not convicted” and
expressed some sensitivity to placing the accused in an impossible
catch-22 position to establish the relevance of documents he had not
seen.113 It also indicated that “where the information contained in a
record directly bears on the right to make full answer and defence,
privacy rights must yield to the need to avoid convicting the
innocent”.114 The Court read down the broad insufficient grounds
discussed above so that they only applied to bare assertions and would
not apply if the accused could “point to case specific evidence or
information to show that the record in issue is likely relevant to an issue
at trial or the competence of a witness to testify”.115 The Court also
111
112
113
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stressed that in borderline or uncertain cases, judges should at least look
at the record 116 and that “[i]t can never be in the interests of justice for
an accused to be denied the right to make full answer and defence”.117
As in Darrach, the Court may have preserved some space for judges to
act in cases where the restricted evidence could raise a reasonable doubt
about the accused’s guilt. At the same time upholding the restrictive
production and disclosure regime may have a systemic effect of
deterring unrepresented and under-represented accused from even
attempting to gain access to the complainant’s private records.
Some of the issues discussed in Mills were revisited by the Court a
few years later in R. v. Shearing.118 The Court held that the restrictions
on production of private documents discussed above did not apply in a
case in which the accused had come into lawful possession of the
complainant’s diary. This ruling, however, raises the question of
whether the accused could have obtained production of the diary
through sections 278.1 to 278.9 had he not otherwise gained access to
the diary. Much depends on how trial judges exercise their discretion
with respect to the very broad insufficient grounds provision, as well as
with respect to the balancing of competing rights. The majority of the
Court in Shearing also concluded that the accused could cross-examine
the complainant on her diary including the lack of an entry about the
alleged sexual assault. Don Stuart has suggested that Shearing may
indicate a shift of tone back to Seaboyer119 and towards the primacy of
the accused’s right to full answer and defence.120 For example, Binnie J.
took the opportunity to disagree with a judge below who had concluded
that “Mills has shifted the balance away from the primary emphasis on
the rights of the accused” on the basis that Mills “itself affirms the
primacy — in the last resort — of the requirement of a fair trial to avoid
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the wrongful conviction of the innocent”.121 Professor Stuart is correct to
point out this shift in tone, one that may be related to heightened
awareness of wrongful convictions in sexual assault cases, but the fact
remains that the restrictions on production and disclosure in sections
278.1-278.9 remain in place even if they were not applicable on the
particular facts of Shearing.
The material discussed in this section suggests that Parliament may
be relatively unconcerned with the risk of convicting the innocent when
it legislates. Although the Court has interpreted such legislation to leave
some room for judges to protect the innocent in individual cases, the
Court in both Mills and Darrach was reluctant to strike down legislation
that by imposing high hurdles on the accused to gain access to evidence
may increase the systemic risk of wrongful convictions in future cases.

V. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROSECUTORIAL AND POLICE
MISCONDUCT THAT CONTRIBUTES TO WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Even the most generous protections for disclosure will not protect
innocence if they are flouted by the police or prosecutors. Although it
would be a mistake to reduce wrongful convictions to questions of
individual misconduct as opposed to systemic failures, misconduct by
police and prosecutors has been found to contribute to wrongful
convictions. This raises the issue of the standards for holding
prosecutors and police accountable for such conduct.
The Court related the Crown’s duty to disclose relevant evidence to
the distinct role of the prosecutor as a Minister of Justice who is
supposed to be more concerned that justice is done than in winning the
case. This vision of the prosecutor suggested not only that the
prosecutor should never knowingly suppress information that would
support the accused’s claim to innocence, but also that the prosecutor
should comply readily with broad rights of disclosure that are designed
to serve the interests of justice.122 In Nelles v. Ontario,123 the Supreme
Court appealed to the same vision of the prosecutor as a minister of
justice to justify the rejection of the idea that prosecutors should be
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absolutely immune from civil actions with respect to the performance of
their duties. Justice Lamer quoted Rand J.’s famous statement in
Boucher v. The Queen that “[t]he role of prosecutor excludes any notion
of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which
in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal
responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense
of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings.”
He also reasoned that absolute immunity from civil liability could have
the effect of denying access to a Charter remedy because a prosecutor
who engaged in a malicious prosecution “would be depriving an
individual of the right to liberty and security of the person in a manner
that does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice.”124 This
aspect of the case has at times been neglected, but it constitutionalizes
malicious prosecutions lawsuits125 and gives content to the section 7
principle that the innocent should not be punished. Only L’HeureuxDubé J. in dissent was prepared to take the view that “[t]he freedom of
action of Attorneys General and Crown Attorneys is vital to the
effective functioning of our criminal justice system. In my view, the
greater public interest is best served by giving absolute immunity to
these agents.”126
In Proulx v. Quebec (Attorney General),127 the Supreme Court in a
narrow 4:3 decision upheld a successful malicious prosecution suit on
the basis that the prosecutors had charged the plaintiff with first degree
murder without reasonable and probable grounds and on the basis of an
improper purpose related to the defence of a defamation suit. The
majority found many flaws in the identification evidence and
surreptitious electric recordings relied upon by the Crown and stressed
that the Crown “must have sufficient evidence to believe that guilt could
properly be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before reasonable and
probable cause exists, and criminal proceedings can be initiated. A
lower threshold for initiating prosecutions would be incompatible with
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the prosecutor’s role as a public officer charged with ensuring justice is
respected and pursued.”128
The Court also held that the prosecutor acted with malice which was
broadly interpreted to include improper purpose either by allowing the
prosecution to be used in aid of a defence of a defamation action or
through a “tainted tunnel vision” in which the prosecutor decided “to
secure a conviction at all costs” with the “tainted assistance” of a former
police officer who was defending a defamation action brought by the
accused. The majority stressed that Nelles must not be taken to have
established a “remedy . . . only in theory and not in practice”.129
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in her dissent argued that the fact the
plaintiff was committed at a preliminary hearing and convicted of
murder at trial was telling evidence that the Crown had reasonable and
probable grounds to charge the accused.130 This conclusion, however,
ignores the fact recognized in United States v. Burns that the criminal
process has produced wrongful convictions. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé
argued that there was no evidence that the Crown attorney “acted for
personal purposes, out of vengeance or ill-will toward the appellant, in
bad faith or beyond his mandate for improper purposes, or that he
committed a fraud on the law”.131 Although the dissent’s malice standard
included improper purposes, its restrictive approach was highlighted by
the idea of ill-will, vengeance and fraud.
The majority’s judgment in Proulx is an important recognition that
the Nelles standard for malicious prosecution includes a broader range
of improper purpose and is not limited to proof of malice as a narrow
form of individual subjective fault. The majority’s recognition of
“tainted tunnel vision” as a form of malice is also intriguing given how
recent public inquiries have found tunnel vision to be a prime cause of
wrongful convictions.132 The Court’s affirmation of a damage claim of
over $1 million in Proulx also suggests that some victims of malicious
prosecutions will be successful in obtaining significant compensation.
At the same time, however, the Court in Proulx made clear that a
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successful malicious prosecution action “must be based on more than
recklessness or gross negligence”.133 This dicta, however, should not be
read as precluding liability based on negligence for prosecutorial
misconduct which was not at issue in Proulx. Indeed, a number of
Courts of Appeals have left the door open to actions for negligent
prosecutions134 and the Supreme Court has not fully shut it.
In my view, there is much to be said for a broader liability rule that
could apply not only to “tainted tunnel vision” but to grossly negligent
tunnel vision and negligent prosecutions.135 In such an approach, liability
might be better directed at the Crown as an entity136 as opposed to
individual prosecutors in recognition that many prosecutorial abuses are
caused more by “organizational factors such as excessive workload,
poor standard operating procedures and … tunnel vision” than “illwilled individuals”.137 To the extent that reliance in Nelles and Proulx is
placed on the high standards of prosecutorial conduct contemplated in
Boucher, one would have thought that this might justify requiring higher
standards of conduct on Crown prosecutors than simply that they refrain
from acting out of malice, ill will or vengeance. In Stinchcombe, the
Boucher vision of the prosecutor as a minister of justice was used to
justify very high standards for the disclosure of all relevant evidence
and not more minimal standards that would only prohibit bad faith and
fraudulent failures to make full disclosure.
Although one might have thought that the Court’s decision in Nelles
laid to rest any idea that prosecutors are immune, they resurfaced in
Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta138 where the Attorney General of
Alberta argued that prosecutors should be immune from disciplinary
decisions before the law society in relation to delayed disclosure of a
DNA test that was favourable to the accused. The Supreme Court held
that prosecutors could be subject to professional discipline so long as
they were not engaged in a good faith and proper exercise of
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prosecutorial discretion. It held that “[r]eview by the Law Society for
bad faith or improper purpose by a prosecutor does not constitute a
review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion per se, since an official
action which is undertaken in bad faith or for improper motives is not
within the scope of the powers of the Attorney General”.139 The Court
appeared to have applied the high standard that a prosecutor must act in
bad faith or for improper purposes not only to exercises of prosecutorial
discretion, but to disclosure violations even though it rightly
characterized disclosure as a matter of “prosecutorial duty” and not a
matter of “prosecutorial discretion”.140 Although the bad faith or
dishonesty standard has been defended as consistent with Nelles,141 my
own view is that it may place a higher premium on proof of subjective
fault than the majority’s decision in Proulx.
The high Krieger threshold of bad faith or improper purpose may
make it extremely difficult to subject prosecutors to professional
discipline in a manner that might help prevent wrongful convictions.
This is unfortunate because law society discipline should serve a
preventive and licensing function142 that is not necessarily limited to the
type of conduct that attracts civil liability for intentional torts.
Fortunately, prosecutors across Canada are starting to demonstrate an
admirable desire to learn from the experience of wrongful convictions
and are probably in front of most law societies on these matters.143
Nevertheless, requiring higher standards for prosecutors with respect to
both civil liability and professional discipline might help minimize the
risk of wrongful convictions. A negligence standard is not an invitation
to judicial second-guessing of prosecutorial conduct and it should not
deter legitimate exercises of prosecutorial discretion.
A reluctance to impose negligence standards on prosecutors would
create an anomaly with respect to the police who are subject to liability
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in negligence.144 In Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse,145 the Supreme Court
refused to strike out negligence claims against a Police Chief in relation
to the failure of officers to co-operate with a Special Investigation Unit
investigation into a fatal shooting.146 Justice Iacobucci observed for the
Court that:
Although the vast majority of police officers in our country exercise
their powers responsibly, members of the force have a significant
capacity to affect members of the public adversely through improper
conduct in the exercise of police functions. It is only reasonable that
members of the public vulnerable to the consequences of police
misconduct would expect that a chief of police would take reasonable
care to prevent, or at least to discourage, members of the force from
injuring members of the public through improper conduct in the
exercise of police functions.147

Applying the above-quoted standard, the police should have a duty
of care towards subjects of investigations for negligent conduct that
might contribute to a wrongful conviction and there should be no policy
reasons, especially as related to indeterminate liability, to defeat such a
duty of care. The Court has frequently held that the common law should
reflect Charter values, and it has already recognized the relevance of
section 7 of the Charter in Nelles. The imposition of a duty of care on
the police with respect to subjects of investigations would respect the
section 7 principle that the innocent should not be punished. It would
provide potential remedies for individual victims of negligent police
investigations, including those that have resulted in wrongful
convictions or other miscarriages of justice, and it would also act as a
systemic incentive to encourage the police to take reasonable steps to
prevent wrongful convictions in future cases.
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The duty of care on the police when they conduct investigations will
likely be clarified by the Supreme Court in the upcoming case of Hill v.
Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board.148 A five judge
panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal unanimously accepted that police
officers owed a duty of care to a suspect and that harm to the suspect from
a negligent investigation was reasonably foreseeable. Justice MacPherson
for the entire panel on this issue rejected the idea that liability for
negligence would interfere with valid police work. He stated:
The assertion that the imposition of a legal duty of care on the police
with respect to their criminal investigations will cause the police to
change the way they perform their professional duties is, in my view,
both unproven and unlikely. Surgeons do not turn off the light over the
operating room table because they owe a duty of care to their patients.
They perform the operation, with care. The owners of summer resorts
do not lock the gates because they owe a duty of care to their
customers. They open their resorts and take care to make them safe. In
short, the “chilling effect” scenario … is, in my view, both speculative
and counterintuitive.149

The Court of Appeal stated while its conclusions were at odds with
those of the House of Lords,150 it was consistent with the Supreme
Court’s refusal to strike out negligence claims against a police chief in
Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse.151 Although the Court of Appeal
distinguished prosecutors from police on the basis that the former
perform quasi-judicial duties, all of the other functional considerations
that supported negligence liability in Hill would seem to apply to
prosecutorial negligence. For example, in both cases there would be “no
alternative remedy for the loss suffered by a person by reason of
wrongful prosecution and conviction”, the right to liberty and the
principles of fundamental justice under section 7 would be implicated
and there would be no concerns about indeterminate liability or liability
for legitimate policy choices.152
Hill will also be an important case on the merits because the Ontario
Court of Appeal split 3:2 on whether the police officers were negligent
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in their investigation. The majority held that the police had not acted
negligently despite the fact that the plaintiff, an Aboriginal person, was
the only non-white person in a 12-person photo line-up used in an
attempt to identify a serial bank robber that had been described by many
witnesses as non-white. Faulty identifications are the leading cause of
wrongful convictions and the case may provide the Supreme Court with
an opportunity to clarify proper identification procedures. The case also
involves the equally important issue of tunnel vision as the police and
the prosecutor persisted in the prosecution despite the fact that the serial
robberies continued after Mr. Hill was imprisoned and another suspect
was identified and eventually charged with other robberies. Finally, the
case will again raise the issue of the over-representation of Aboriginal
persons in the criminal justice system.153 Justices Feldman and Laforme
noted in their strong dissent that this was a “very significant case
involving another wrongful conviction of an Aboriginal person in
Canada, who served more than 20 months in prison for a crime he did
not commit…”.154 An affirmation that the police owe suspects a duty of
care and an articulation of appropriate standards for cross-racial
identifications could help individuals receive effective remedies for
wrongful convictions and encourage the police to take reasonable
precautions in all cases against the real risk of wrongful convictions.

VI. THE PROTECTION OF INNOCENCE AND THE ROLE
OF DEFENCE COUNSEL
Prosecutors and police are not the only criminal process actors that can
contribute to miscarriages of justice. Another area crucial to the
protection of innocence is the adverse consequences of the accused not
being represented or being inadequately represented by defence counsel.
The Supreme Court’s section 7 jurisprudence seems surprisingly
underdeveloped given the importance of these topics and the
voluminous comparative jurisprudence under the American Bill of
Rights. In general, the Court has opened the door to interventions in
individual cases where a lack of counsel or inadequate representation of
counsel may contribute to a miscarriage of justice in the case before the
court, but it has yet to take a strong stand that will encourage adequate
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defence lawyering as a systemic safeguard that can lessen the risks of
wrongful convictions in future cases.
In R. v. Prosper,155 the Supreme Court refused to require toll free
access to duty counsel in part because the framers of the Charter had
considered but rejected a right to counsel for those without sufficient
means to pay for counsel when required in the interests of justice. Chief
Justice Lamer also expressed concerns about requiring governments to
spend funds or devising remedies to enforce positive obligations.156
Although it stressed that the framers’ decision to reject a right to legal
aid was entitled to more weight than the more general intent of the
framers on other issues,157 the Court’s approach in Prosper was in
tension to its interpretative approach in many other Charter cases. For
example, the Court was not deterred by relatively clear intent that the
framers intended section 7 of the Charter to only provide procedural
protections and that it would not affect abortion.158 The concern in
Prosper about not requiring governments to spend money on positive
obligations was also in tension to other Charter cases that implicitly
required the expenditure of funds.159
In the 1999 case of New Brunswick (Minister of Health and
Community Services) v. G. (J.),160 the Court took a somewhat bolder
approach than in Prosper and ordered that section 7 of the Charter
required the provision of counsel in a hearing in which the state sought
custody of a parent’s child. The Court stressed the complexity of the
scheduled three-day hearing in which 15 affidavits and two expert
reports would be presented, as well as the limited capacities of the
parent and the stakes of extending the state’s custody of the children for
another six months. The Court considered the state’s interests in
controlling legal aid expenditures, but found that these were outweighed
by the need to provide counsel when essential to ensure a fair hearing.
Chief Justice Lamer reconciled his approach with that taken in Prosper
simply by indicating that the section 7 right to counsel would not apply
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in all cases where a person’s life, liberty or security of the person was at
stake, but only in those cases where a fair hearing would not be possible
without counsel.161 This suggests that section 7 will generally only
produce case by case remedies with respect to the provision of counsel.
It is odd that after 20 years of section 7 jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has not yet outlined the test for when defence counsel is required
to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial. In G. (J.), the Court took note
of a variety of Court of Appeal cases dealing with section 7 claims for
counsel in criminal trials, but did not comment on the validity of those
cases or the appropriate remedy that would apply in the criminal
context. The remedial problems should not be insurmountable as the
Court would have the options of either staying proceedings or ordering
counsel to be provided.162
One justification for a broader approach to the right to have counsel
provided is the increased dangers of wrongful convictions or other
miscarriages of justice when an accused is not assisted by a lawyer in
our increasingly complex criminal process.163 One shortcoming to such a
broad systemic approach, however, may be that the prevalence of
wrongful convictions in less serious cases is not well known and the
causes of such wrongful convictions are not well understood. The
reasons for this are speculative but groups such as AIDWYC
understandably focus their limited resources on the most serious cases.
There are also considerable costs, including in terms of time and
exposure, in invoking the process under sections 696.1-696.6 of the
Criminal Code.164
In G.D.B., the Court considered the issue of inadequate assistance of
counsel in a criminal trial.165 The claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel revolved around a defence counsel’s tactical decision not to use
a tape recording of the complainant denying shortly after she left home
that her stepfather had sexually molested her. In this case the Court
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recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel as a principle of
fundamental justice under section 7,166 but adopted the deferential and
oft-criticized American test for determining ineffective assistance of
counsel. Under the Strickland v. Washington167 test an accused must first
establish that the alleged incompetence of counsel caused a miscarriage
of justice and then that counsel’s actions were unreasonable. With
respect to the first step, the Court in G.D.B. did not specifically address
the issue of the probability of a miscarriage of justice occurring and
simply concluded “[t]here was no miscarriage of justice”.168 The United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington169 has, however,
required that there be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” This standard imposes a high
standard on the accused to establish a reasonable probability of a
miscarriage of justice whereas in other areas of Canadian constitutional
law, including with respect to the right to full answer and defence, the
focus is on whether there is a reasonable possibility of a miscarriage of
justice.170 If G.D.B. has indeed incorporated the Strickland requirement
of a reasonable probability of a miscarriage of justice then the Court has
adopted a higher standard for intervening when the cause of the alleged
miscarriage of justice is ineffective assistance of counsel as opposed to
denial of the right to full answer and defence. Such differing approaches
to miscarriages of justice seem wrong in principle. A miscarriage of
justice is a miscarriage of justice however it has been caused. Moreover,
a miscarriage should be defined in a manner consistent with the
fundamental requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. The reasonable possibility standard is more consistent with the
reasonable doubt standard than the American reasonable probability
standard.
With respect to the second step in the test for ineffective assistance
of counsel, the Court in G.D.B. indicated that there is “a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of
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reasonable professional assistance”.171 The second step raises the
question of whether a court could in good conscience ignore a
reasonable probability or preferably a reasonable possibility of a
miscarriage of justice on the basis that the lawyer’s conduct would still
fall within the presumption of reasonableness.
From the perspective of avoiding miscarriages of justice, it is
unfortunate that the Court has followed the restrictive and oftcriticized172 American approach and not followed the approach taken by
the Quebec Court of Appeal and most Commonwealth countries which
focuses simply on whether counsel’s conduct rendered “the conviction
unsafe and unsatisfactory”.173 The Commonwealth approach does not
attempt to judge the flagrancy of counsel’s error.174 Moreover, the
Commonwealth approach also seems to be more consistent with the
focus on a reasonable possibility of a miscarriage of justice in other
section 7 jurisprudence. The Court’s approach in G.D.B. seems less than
optimal both in terms of responding to a risk of a miscarriage of justice
in an individual case and encouraging systemic measures that will
reduce the risk of wrongful convictions in future cases.175

VII. JUDGES, THE REASONS FOR CONVICTIONS AND
THE GROUNDS FOR APPEAL
Before the Charter, the Supreme Court was reluctant to require judges to
give reasons for their decisions on the basis that “the volume of criminal
work makes an indiscriminate requirement of reasons impractical,
especially in provincial criminal courts, and the risk of ending up with a
171
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ritual formula makes it undesirable to fetter the discretion of trial
judges”.176 This approach, including a presumption that trial judges know
the law and concerns about slowing the system of justice, influenced the
Court’s 1994 decision in R. v. Burns not to require trial judges to give
reasons for their verdicts or decisions. In that case, the Court upheld a
conviction of sexual and indecent assault despite the Court of Appeal’s
concerns about the young age of the complainant and the fact that the
complainant had initially complained of sexual abuse by her stepbrother
and not the accused.177 In 1995, the Court upheld the briefest and most
conclusory of reasons provided by a trial judge about the admissibility of
statements to the police after a complex voir dire.178 In neither of these
cases did the Court make reference to section 7 of the Charter or related
concepts of fairness and reasons in administrative law. These cases
represented a total failure to recognize that a lack of reasons could
contribute to a miscarriage of justice in an individual case and that the
systemic message that judges need not deliver reasons could encourage
practices that could increase the risk of wrongful convictions.
In two cases decided in 1996, the Court re-visited the issue and
made clear that Burns should not be read as authority for the broad
proposition that trial judges never have to provide reasons, especially in
cases where the law was unclear179 or where the evidence was confused
and contradictory.180 In 2002, the Court addressed the trial judge’s duty
to give reasons in a series of cases. The lead case, R. v. Sheppard, held
that a trial judge had given insufficient reasons when he convicted an
accused of possession of stolen property in a case with no physical
evidence and by asserting that he found the testimony of the accused’s
ex-girlfriend more credible than that of the accused. Although the Court
justified the requirement for reasons in terms of explaining the verdict to
the parties and the public, much of the decision related the need for
reasons to the right to have meaningful appellate review. Justice Binnie
stressed that “[t]he simple underlying rule is that if, in the opinion of the
appeal court, the deficiencies in the reasons prevent meaningful
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appellate review of the correctness of the decision, then an error of law
has been committed”.181 He also added that this functional approach to
reasons and appeals would in appropriate cases allow appellate courts to
conclude that the absence of reasons was either an error of law, a
miscarriage of justice or contributed to an unreasonable verdict under
section 686 of the Criminal Code.182 The reasons were insufficient in
Sheppard in large part because it was not clear that the trial judge had
properly applied the reasonable doubt standard even if he did find the
ex-girlfriend’s testimony to be more credible than that of the accused.183
A more robust approach to the need for reasons, however, would have
created a free-standing right under section 7 of the Charter to reasons,
both in order to ensure procedural justice for the accused and, as
Professor Quigley has suggested, “as a mechanism for avoiding
wrongful convictions”. 184
The utility of the Sheppard approach in providing relief from
possible miscarriages of justice is inextricably tied to whether the
grounds for appeals from convictions under section 686 are adequate. In
the companion case of R. v. Braich,185 the Court held that the trial
judge’s reasons were sufficient despite the fact the British Columbia
Court of Appeal had concluded that a conviction was unsafe because of
mistakes and inconsistencies in the identification evidence given by
victims of a drive-by shooting. The Court stressed that the absence of
reasons was not a free-standing ground of appeal and that the Court of
Appeal had not found the trial judge’s guilty verdict to be unreasonable.
Justice Binnie concluded that the Court of Appeal “simply took the view
that if the trial judge had thought harder about the problems and written
a more extensive analysis he might have reached a different conclusion
… [the Court of Appeal] considered the conviction ‘unsafe’ but, with
respect, his conclusion was driven more by the peculiarities of the facts
181
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than the alleged inadequacies of the trial reasons. A lurking doubt about
an ‘unsafe’ verdict is not sufficient to justify appellate intervention.”186
Braich underlines how closely the Court’s functional approach to the
giving of reasons is tied to the existing grounds of appeal. Indeed,
the functional approach to reasons in Sheppard and Braich begs the
question of whether the existing grounds of appeals from convictions
under section 686 are adequate.
In his report on Guy Paul Morin’s wrongful conviction, Kaufman J.
recommended that Courts of Appeal should be able to set aside a
conviction on the basis of a lurking doubt as to guilt.187 Justice Kaufman
did not address whether such a standard should be introduced through
statutory expansion of the existing grounds of appeals or through
judicial interpretation of the existing grounds of appeal. He did,
however, cite some Courts of Appeal that had already introduced the
concept of the safety of the verdict into the existing grounds of appeals.
Indeed, in 1996, the Supreme Court had come close to reading the
lurking doubt standard into section 686 when it ruled that “the
conviction rests on shaky ground and that it would be unsafe to maintain
it” adding that the power to overturn unreasonable guilty verdicts under
section 686(1)(a) “was intended as an additional and salutary safeguard
against the conviction of the innocent”.188
In R. v. Biniaris,189 however, the Supreme Court refused to read the
lurking doubt concept into section 686 when it stated that “It is
insufficient for the court of appeal to refer to a vague unease, or a
lingering or lurking doubt based on its own review of the evidence. This
‘lurking doubt’ may be a powerful trigger for thorough appellate
scrutiny of the evidence, but it is not, without further articulation of the
basis for such doubt, a proper basis upon which to interfere with the
findings of a jury.”190 Although the Court has made clear that a lack of
reasons or a lurking doubt may be a trigger to find that a conviction is
unreasonable or a miscarriage of justice under section 686, it has refused
to make a lurking doubt in itself a ground for appeal. It is to be hoped
that appellate courts will use the existing law to intervene in cases where
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there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict may be unsafe, but the
Supreme Court’s approach to reasons and to the existing grounds of
appeal may not be optimal in promoting systemic practices to minimize
the risk of wrongful convictions.
The close and sometimes confusing connection between the reasons
given by trial judges and the grounds for appeal courts to overturn
convictions under section 686 was at issue in the recent case of R. v.
Gagnon.191 In that case, the Court split 3:2 over the adequacy of the
reasons given to convict the accused of sexual assault of a young child
that he had cared for in a day-care centre. Justices Bastarache and
Abella for the majority distinguished Sheppard and applied Braich on
the basis that the trial judge had given extensive reasons for accepting
the testimony of the child complainant and for not finding the accused’s
testimony that denied the sexual assault to be credible.192 They indicated
that after having “admonished trial judges to explain their reasons on
credibility and reasonable doubt in a way that permits adequate review
by an appellate court … it would be counterproductive to dissect them
minutely in a way that undermines the trial judge’s responsibility for
weighing all of the evidence.”193 As in Braich, the majority in Gagnon
stressed that although the Court of Appeal had overturned the
conviction, it had not found the verdict to be unreasonable and that there
was a reasonable basis for the trial judge’s conclusions on credibility.
In dissent, Deschamps and Fish JJ. consistently blended their
analysis of the sufficiency of the reasons under Sheppard and the
reasonableness of the verdict under Biniaris. For example, they
concluded that “regardless of whether … [the trial judge’s] decision is
characterized as being unreasonable, the judgment is found to be wrong
in law, or … the reasons are considered inadequate … we must reach
the same conclusion: the guilty verdict entered by the trial judge should
be set aside and a new trial ordered…”.194 Their dissent also raises the
possibility that the standard for concluding that a guilty verdict is
unreasonable may be lower in judge-alone trials because of the ability of
appellate courts to scrutinize the judge’s reasons. They stressed that
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“[j]uries do not give reasons for their verdict, but judges do. A judge’s
verdict must be reviewed with this in mind.”195 In the result, they were
prepared to review the trial judge’s reasons for rejecting the accused’s
testimony on the basis that those conclusions conflicted “with the bulk
of judicial experience in the assessment of credibility”.196 At the same
time, however, Deschamps and Fish JJ. focused solely on assessing the
trial judge’s reasons for rejecting the accused’s testimony while not
addressing the trial judge’s acceptance of the complainant’s testimony.
The split in Gagnon suggests that the close connection under
Sheppard between the adequacy of reasons and the grounds for appeal
may sow confusion. As a matter of first principle, it might be advisable to
separate the adequacy of reasons from the reasonableness of the verdict:
each issue is important in its own right. On this basis, the majority’s
approach in Gagnon seems persuasive on the adequacy of the reasons, but
is lacking in its refusal to address the reasonableness of the verdict. In
contrast, the minority’s approach does not fully address the reasonableness of the verdict given its narrow focus on the reasons for rejecting the
accused’s testimony and its refusal to deal with the child’s testimony
which the trial judge found to be reliable because the child’s reports of
having been abused were spontaneous, consistent and detailed.
The minority’s demanding approach to the reasonableness of the
trial judge’s verdict also begs the questions of the adequacy of the test
for determining the reasonableness of a jury’s verdict which by
definition will not include reasons. Indeed, the minority seems to
suggest that in jury trials the focus has only been on whether the verdict
can be supported on the evidence whereas section 686 contemplates that
verdicts can be set aside when they are “unreasonable or cannot be
supported by the evidence”.197 As will be seen, the role of juries in
wrongful convictions is particularly problematic.
195
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VIII. JURORS, SECRECY AND MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE
Although the Court has indicated that a failure by trial judges to give
reasons to support a guilty verdict may be a grounds for a successful
appeal, it has taken a position on jury secrecy that, with the exception of
evidence of external interference, suggests that courts will not consider
any reasons that may emerge about why a jury has convicted an
accused.
In R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer198 the Court rejected a section 7 challenge
to the traditional doctrine of jury secrecy including a more flexible case
by case approach articulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal and the
Law Reform Commission of Canada. The Court reasoned that “We
would be doing jurors a disservice, in my view, to tell them, on the one
hand, that everything they say in the course of their deliberations is
private and confidential, and, on the other hand, to decide after the
deliberations are over whether in fact we will give effect to our
guarantee of confidentiality…. More certainty and predictability is
required for jury secrecy to be meaningful.”199 This approach, however,
ignores that even information covered by solicitor and client privilege or
police informer privileges is subject to innocence at stake exceptions.200
It raises the unedifying prospect of confirming convictions that were
decided by a majority as opposed to a unanimous decision of the jury or
decisions that were influenced by racist stereotypes that cannot be
totally controlled through the use of challenges for cause. With respect
to the latter, the evidence sought to be admitted in Sawyer related to
claims that racial comments were made by the jury in a trial of coaccused, one who was white, the other black.201 In addition, there is
some evidence that one of the jurors who wrongly convicted Donald
Marshall Jr. may have been influenced by racist stereotypes about both
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the Aboriginal accused and the African-Canadian victim.202 The Court’s
approach to even possibly racist reasons used by a jury to convict
appears to be: “don’t ask, don’t admit”. The costs of such injustices are
a very high price to pay for maintaining the confidences of jurors or the
finality of their verdicts.
The Pan case could have been decided differently if it was viewed
through the prism of concerns about wrongful convictions and
innocence at stake exceptions to even the most revered privileges. The
Court raised the spectre of acquittals being overturned or tainted by
evidence about the jury’s deliberations,203 but this would not be a
problem under a limited exception that admitted evidence of jury
deliberations only when it revealed a reasonable possibility of a
miscarriage of justice. The Court’s discussion of whether the common
law rule and section 649 of the Code violated section 7 of the Charter
never really engaged the principle that the innocent should not be
punished.204 Indeed, the innocence at stake principle is a foundational
principle that should inform both the common law and section 7 of the
Charter.
In addition to the vital question of remedies in individual cases of
possible miscarriages of justice, a bolder approach in Pan would have
invalidated the crime of revealing the deliberations of the jury as an
unjustified violation of freedom of expression. Such a decision could
have encouraged systemic reforms by legalizing research about how
actual jurors make their crucial decisions. The Court recognized the
need for such research, but relied upon an invitation to Parliament to
consider the case for legislative reform, even though the Law Reform
Commission had already made the case for reform in 1982.205 The past
record on issues affecting the protection of innocence suggests that the
continued wait for Parliamentary reform could be long indeed.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The principle that the innocent should not be punished is the most
fundamental of all the fundamental principles of justice. The
punishment of the innocent is a travesty of justice that benefits no one.
Nevertheless the implementation of this bedrock principle is complex
and controversial. A primary issue is what constitutes innocence.
Although DNA exonerations and other forms of exonerating the
wrongfully convicted and the actually innocent are valuable reminders
of the fallibility of the system, it is unrealistic to expect such certainty in
all cases. Innocence in this paper has been defined in relation to the
broader concept of miscarriages of justice which is based on the
foundational principles that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt and that trials must be fair. Cases such as United States of
America v. Burns206 recognize the tragic reality of wrongful convictions
and require courts to take systemic steps to minimize the risk of
wrongful convictions in future cases, but courts must remain attentive to
any miscarriage of justice in any particular case. Both individual and
systemic strategies to protect innocence are necessary and
complementary: no systemic measure will reduce the risk of error in the
criminal process to zero and hence the system must always be attentive
to claims of miscarriages of justice in individual cases.
Another disagreement is whether the principle that the innocent not
be punished should be balanced with other interests. Drawing on the
work of Lon Fuller and Ronald Dworkin,207 I have suggested that a
useful distinction can be made between the need for courts to respond to
a reasonable possibility of a miscarriage of justice in an individual case
before them without regard to competing social interests and the need to
take systemic but proportionate measures in all future cases to minimize
the risk of wrongful convictions. The former strategy is well represented
in the primacy that the Court has given in its section 7 jurisprudence to
protecting the accused’s right to full answer and defence but is
compromised by suggestions in cases such as G.D.B.208 that courts
should wait until a miscarriage of justice is probable. The latter systemic
strategy is well represented by decisions such as United States of
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America v. Burns209 and R. v. Stinchcombe210 which adopt systemic
safeguards in recognition of the risk of wrongful convictions in some
future cases, but only after carefully considering whether the new rights
articulated by the Court would have a proportionate effect on competing
social interests.
Many but not all of the cases examined in this paper have involved
the interpretation of section 7 of the Charter. Some of the cases were
decided simply on the basis of evolving common law principles. The
process of constitutionalization, however, may help underline questions
of principle. The Court should aspire to using the idea that the innocent
not be punished as a coherent and demanding principle that can inform
much of section 7 and the related common law. Greater use of the
constitutional principle that the innocent not be punished may also
provide some, albeit not complete, protection from legislative
resistance. Parliament’s record on the protection of innocence has not
been inspiring. It has placed restrictions on the ability of the accused to
access evidence in sexual assault cases and it has ignored judicial
invitations to take steps to minimize the risk of wrongful convictions in
other cases. One of the main messages of this paper is that the protection
of innocence, in both its individual and systemic dimensions, should be
seen as a matter within the inherent domain of the judiciary. The task of
protecting the innocent should not be left to Parliament as a majoritarian
institution with little apparent concern for remote risks of punishing the
innocent. In this regard, we are fortunate that the Supreme Court in
cases such as Stinchcombe and Burns was prepared to take matters of
justice into their own hands.
The topics examined in this paper have been eclectic,211 but this
underlines how the principle of protecting the innocent can help direct
the wide swath that section 7 cuts across the justice system. The task of
protecting innocence is too important and too pervasive to be cabined to
the discrete categories of substantive, procedural or evidential law or to
be limited to criminal as opposed to civil or administrative law. The
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protection of innocence cannot be limited to the operation of the
criminal justice system and for this reason the liability of criminal
justice actors to civil actions and professional discipline were discussed
in this paper. In the post 9/11 environment, it is dangerous to limit
concerns about imprisoning the innocent to criminal law and the
Supreme Court should be concerned with protecting innocence at both
individual and systemic levels in the forthcoming cases that will
consider whether the use of immigration security certificate to detain
terrorist suspects indefinitely without full disclosure or adversarial
challenge of the government’s case violates section 7 of the Charter.
Wrongful convictions have disproportionately occurred in terrorism cases
and care should be taken before sanctioning procedures that provide far
less protections for innocence than the criminal trial.212
In the end, we must ask whether section 7 of the Charter has
improved the protection of the innocence in our justice system? It is too
soon to make a final judgment in part because we are only starting to
understand the prevalence and causes of wrongful convictions.
Nevertheless, there have been some important victories for the
protection of innocence under section 7 of the Charter. In a number of
cases, most notably Burns, the Court has recognized that the conviction
of the innocent is a problem that requires remedies. Admitting that there
is a problem is a necessary first step to addressing it. The Court’s
decision in Stinchcombe was an important step in creating broad
disclosure rights and relating a failure to make full disclosure with
wrongful convictions. At the same time, however, the Court has failed
to apply the principle that the innocent should not be convicted in the
context of the confidentiality of jury deliberations. In other areas such as
the right to reasons, the right to adequate legal assistance, civil and
professional discipline for prosecutorial misconduct and the production,
disclosure and admissibility of some crucial defence evidence in sexual
assault prosecutions, the Court deserves credit for opening a door for
remedies for miscarriages of justice in individual cases. Nevertheless,
the section 7 jurisprudence in all of these areas does not live up to the
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promise of Burns by taking broader systemic measures to reduce the
risk of wrongful convictions in future cases.
Systemic reforms to minimize the risk of miscarriages of justice in
future cases should not be undertaken recklessly, but with attention to
principles of proportionality drawn from section 1 of the Charter.
Application of proportionality principles in cases such as Stinchcombe
and Burns, however, suggests that the result of disciplined
proportionality analysis may be more, not less, systemic protections
against wrongful convictions. The most fundamental of our fundamental
principles of justice, the right of the innocent not to be punished, has
rightly received significant attention under section 7 of the Charter.
More, however, needs to be done.

